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Galbraith Redux
Economics and the Public Purpose. By John Kenneth Galbraith.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973. Pp. xvi, 334. $10.00.
Reviewed by James Tobint
John Kenneth Galbraith is surely the best known economist in
the world today and, textbook writers aside, probably the most read
economist of all time. Economics and the Public Purpose" is his
mature restatement and extension of the themes of The New In-
dustrial State (1967 and 1971)2 and The Affluent Society (1958),3
both best sellers. The book deserves serious and candid review, and
that is what this reviewer, a long-time friend and admirer of the
author, is going to give it.
I
As the title says, Galbraith is writing as much about economics as
about the American economy. On page after page he contrasts his
picture of the economy to that of "neoclassical economics,"4 and
refers derisively to the blindness, obtuseness, and irrelevance of the
bulk of his professional colleagues. Worse yet, he finds, economists'
sins of omission and commission serve the ruling corporate "tech-
nostructure." 5 Although Galbraith does not quite charge conscious
venality, he does suggest that economists are protecting "intellectual
and pecuniary capital"-this is strong language from the 1972 Presi-
dent of the American Economic Association.
The attack is familiar from Galbraith's earlier books. By now
the running battle with neoclassical foes is pretty tiresome. Most of
t Sterling Professor of Economics, Yale University.
1. J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE (1973) [hereinafter cited by
page number only].
2. J. GALBRAITH, THE NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE (2d ed. 1971).
3. J. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SocIETY (1958).
4. See pp. 11-18.
5. See p. 82.
6. P. 312.
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Galbraith's readers, of course, know nothing of economics save what
he tells them. Even noneconomist readers must wish Galbraith would,
for once, make a straightforward argument without foils, straw men,
and whipping boys.
There is, goodness knows, plenty of blindness, obtuseness, irrele-
vance, and parochial scholasticism in the discipline of economics.
It is just not true, however, that the profession insists on analyzing
the American economy as if it were an ideal type described by Adam
Smith. Modern economics does not contend that competitive mar-
kets without public intervention do or could achieve maximum
satisfaction of the wants of "sovereign" consumers. Anyone who
takes a freshman course, reads a textbook, peruses the journals, or
scans the titles of new publications can quickly satisfy himself that
the profession does not ignore the salient features of the modern
economy stressed by Professor Galbraith, including conglomerates,
multinationals, monopolies, oligopolies, market failures, environmen-
tal "externalities." Most work of economists is highly empirical and
closely related to practical issues of policy, such as utility regulation,
manpower training, pollution, education, exchange rates, and prop-
erty taxes.
Galbraith identifies contemporary economics with neoclassical eco-
nomic theory. Innocent readers have a right to know what "neoclas-
sical" means. Economists have always been looking for a theory of
value, a theory which explains the relative prices at which com-
modities and resources are traded for one another. Classical econo-
mists-Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx-
sought the answer solely in production costs. Neoclassical economists
in the late 19th century-William Stanley Jevons, Karl Menger, Leon
Walras, Alfred Marshall-showed that relative values are determined
by demand as well as supply, tastes as well as technology, subject
utility as well as cost.
A great intellectual achievement of the neoclassical tradition has
been to spell out what might be called the pure logic of relative
scarcity. For given tastes, technologies, and resource availabilities,
there is in theory a price for every commodity and every factor of
production, a price indicative of its relative scarcity. Corresponding
to these prices are determinate outputs and allocations of all re-
sources and all commodities. When elementary students learn that
a commodity has an "opportunity cost" both in production and con-
sumption, they encounter a simple version of these ideas. The notion
of opportunity cost is indispensable for clear thinking about pollu-
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tion control, gasoline rationing, university finance, subway fares, su-
personic transports, and a host of other practical problems.
The "general equilibrium" solution of the allocation problem
could, in principle, be found and implemented by a socialist plan-
ning board; under certain conditions it can be achieved by com-
petitive markets. The elegance and power of this insight has attracted
the best minds of economics over the years, and the logic of relative
scarcity has been clarified, refined, and extended. No one under-
stands its limitations better than its most sophisticated practitioners.7
Neoclassical theory itself explains why market results cannot be
regarded as socially optimal. First, markets are not competitive. Sec-
ond, even competitive markets fail to handle the uncertain future,
"externalities" like environmental damage, and communally used
goods and services. Third, market processes may result in socially
unacceptable inequalities of income. Fourth, "consumer sovereignty"
must frequently be limited to protect citizens from their own ig-
norance or shortsightedness and from the irresponsibilities of others.
On all these matters a great deal of theoretical and applied work
proceeds, unnoticed by Galbraith.
Vulgar apologists for private enterprise do, of course, invoke the
"free market" to justify the privileges of the rich and powerful. Gal-
braith is dead right to object. But it does not follow that every in-
terference with the market proposed by Congressman Wright Patman,
Secretary Earl Butz, the Federal Power Commission, the Texas Rail-
road Commission, or Galbraith himself therefore is justified. We
have to choose among imperfect alternatives. One does not have to
be a devout disciple of Chicago economic liberalism to prefer market-
clearing by price to gas pump queues, rent controls, wheat acreage
restrictions and resale price maintenance, or to regard cash transfers
as a more efficient and equitable way to redistribute income than
farm price supports, minimum wages, and 35-cent subway fares.
There is a big difference between Galbraithian and straight eco-
nomics, though not the one that Galbraith depicts. He is the leading
exemplar of adjectival or denominative economics, creative nomencla-
ture for the phenomenon described by the author. Galbraith's names
are suggestive-technostructure, planning system,8 bureaucratic sym-
biosis.9 The names make readers think they understand the institu-
tions. Conventional economists, instead, are obsessed with mechanism.
7. See, e.g., Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis, 64 AM. EcoN. REv.
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They like to build models that specify the behavior of the various
actors in an economic drama and trace the outcomes of their in-
teractions.
For Galbraith the economy is as simple as a bicycle; any intelli-
gent, unbrainwashed observer can see at once how it works. For the
straight economist, the economy is more like the human body; a
very complex and often baffling network of interlocking systems.
Galbraith rarely offers a hypothesis that might be tested and con-
ceivably refuted by observation. New names and colorful adjectives
are not testable propositions: Who is to say whether corporate man-
agers and technicians constitute a technostructure? Perhaps because
he believes truth is easy to come by (if only vested interests in false-
hood are overcome), Galbraith offers little evidence for the proposi-
tions he does assert. By contrast, a conventional economist tries to
state testable, refutable hypotheses. He is generally impressed with
the difficulty of empirical verification, and he goes to great pains to
tease information from recalcitrant and ambiguous data.
Consider, for example, Galbraith's description of the United States
as a dual economy, split between the "planning" and "market" sys-
tems.'10 This distinction is the central theme of the book, and it is
important and illuminating. But the observation is only a beginning.
Any recent Ph.D. from M.I.T. would embed it in a model which
takes account of trade and mobility between the two sectors. Solved
or simulated, the model would suggest some observable effects on
employment, wages, prices, inflation." With luck the credibility of
the model could be statistically checked; it might turn out to be an
accurate reflection of reality. No one says Galbraith has to play this
game, though one hopes he might have students who would. But
does he have to denigrate the serious scientific economists who do
engage in this kind of work? The answer is no. It is unbecoming,
unwarranted, and unnecessary.
The dismal science is not noted for literary merit. But the style
of Galbraith's prose has aroused no inconsiderable admiration. Style
and substance are in symbiotic relationship. The style distracts the
reader from the substance. For an author this will be perceived as
an agreeable circumstance. That sentences are frequently begun with
substantive clauses will not escape the attentive reader's notice. Nor
10. See pp. 38-51.
11. See, e.g., A. OKUN, UPWARD MOBILITY IN A HIGH PRESSURE ECONOMY 207-52
(Brookings Paper on Economic Activity No. 1, 1973). Of course Okun's Ph.D. is neither
recent nor from M.I.T.
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is the author a slavish devotee of neoclassical rhetoric. The passive
voice is much favored. The double negative is not abhorred. Re-
viewers' criticisms are explicitly predicted. The reader is invited to
regard the fulfillment of those predictions as proof of the author's
thesis. The overall tone is one of subtle irony. To sustain subtle
irony for 324 pages is a task of no slight sophistication. This tech-
nostrategy cannot be too much admired.
II
The argument of the book will be summarized 12 in nine points,
each followed by the reviewer's comments.
1. The Two Systems. The private enterprise economy of the United
States is about evenly divided between the planning system and the
market system. The planning system is the world of the thousand
largest corporations; the market system contains the smaller corpora-
tions, unincorporated businesses, farmers, self-employed professionals
and artisans, and merchants of vice. In advanced capitalism the "un-
equal development"' 3 of the two systems has resulted in an "in-
equality"' 4 of power which favors the planning system at the expense
of the market system.
Comment. The planning system, as defined by Galbraith, does not
comprise as much of the economy as Galbraith says it does. In 1969,
private business originated 82 percent of national income; the rest
was produced by governments. Of privately produced national in-
come, corporations were the source of 68 percent. There were 1.7
million active corporations, of which the 1,112 largest did 34.5 per-
cent of corporate business. Thus the planning system apparently
accounts for about 23 percent of private business activity, or 19
percent of total national income.' 5
12. This summary leaves out tangential but topical chapters on women and house-
holds, the environment, and the international economy. According to Galbraith, cap-
italist progress made servants too expensive and became dependent on "converting
women to menial personal service" in their own households. P. 31. Galbraith favors
liberation and equality. For the environment, Galbraith endorses "explicit and un-
yielding," p. 290, legal limitations on environmental damage and scornfully dismisses
the taxes and prices beloved of neoclassical economists. As for the international economy,
Galbraith has no use for monetary tinkering or tinkerers; he rightly says there is no
substitute for coordinated planning, p. 322, and most tinkerers would agree.
13. P. 77.
14. Id.
15. Of the 1,112 largest corporations, by asset size, 581 were financial companies.
Galbraith does not exclude them from his calculations, pp. 42-43, though there is a
case for doing so. The 1,079 largest nonfinancial corporations did 40 percent of non-
financial corporate business, or about 23 percent of national income. If corporations
are classified by size of business receipts rather than assets, the 1,137 largest non-
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In any event, Galbraith thinks the planning system is too large.
Sometimes he gives the impression that ever-increasing disproportion
is endemic to our political economy, 16 although he does not flatly
say so. Aggregate concentration figures for 1969, however, are much
the same as those for 1957. In that year the 1,129 largest of 0.95
million active corporations accounted for 34 percent of corporate
business, 23 percent of private business activity, or 19 percent of
total national income. Concentration has increased, nevertheless, in
the sense that 1,112 companies are a much smaller proportion of
the population of enterprises than 1,129 were in 1957.
The concentration of economic activity in the 100 largest cor-
porations has steadily increased since 1945 but at a much slower
rate recently. This may be true of the share of the 500 largest
manufacturers as well; 17 their sales grew 187 percent from 1955 to
1970, while gross national product grew 145 percent, but the in-
creases between 1965 and 1970, 45 percent and 43 percent respec-
tively, were quite comparable.
Membership in "X largest" lists is not constant. Of the 100 largest
industrial corporations, an average of 1.7 are displaced each year.' 8
On trends in concentration in particular markets, there is a lively
statistical debate. Thanks to the conglomerate movement, market
concentrations have risen less rapidly than aggregate concentration.
Some students say that market concentration has not been increasing
at all.19
None of these subjects is seriously discussed in the book.
2. The Technostructure's Obsession with Growth. The business
firms of economics textbooks and of the market system seek to maxi-
mize the profits of their owner-managers. But the large firms of the
planning system are ruled by their managerial technostructures, not
by their owners. Individually and jointly, the technostructures' ob-
jective is to grow as fast as possible while making decent minimum
profits for the shareholders.
Comment. As Galbraith acknowledges, the divorce of ownership
and control is an old story, suggested by Thorstein Veblen20 and
financial corporations did 44 percent of corporate business, or about 25 percent of
national income. I cannot reproduce Galbraith's estimate that the planning system
accounts for half of private economic activity, which would imply more than 40
percent of national income.
16. Cf. p. 105.
17. See M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 41-44
(1970).
18. See id. at 48-49.
19. See id. at 50-63.
20. See T. VEBLEN, THE ENGINEERS AND THE PRICE SYSTEM (1921).
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documented by Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner Means. 21 William
Baumol '2 2 and Robin Marris23 argued that corporate management
seeks to maximize growth subject to a minimum profit constraint.
Galbraith presents no evidence for the truth of this theory. Since
growth and profits are usually correlated, the growth hypothesis is
not easy to test against profit maximization. Incentive compensation
of executives generally is geared to profit performance and share
values. But it is also undeniable that managers of large organizations
are, other things equal, better paid than those of small organizations.
3. Planning as a Technological Imperative. The new industrial state
is the inevitable consequence of modem technology. Large corpora-
tions-large socialist enterprises, for that matter-generally produce
goods (not services) with complex technology requiring large invest-
ment commitments long in advance of production and sale. That is
why they must plan and why technicians and managers who do the
planning have all the power. Failure is an unacceptable risk. So
the firm controls its environment. It makes sure that consumers and
governments will buy its products. It generates its own investment
funds to avoid dependence on financiers. It captures control of need-
ed raw materials and supplies. It arranges a sympathetic political
climate. And so on.
Comment. Are the risks and lead times of modern technology ex-
ceptional? How about the lead times and risk faced by capitalists who
sent sailing ships to the Far East or began laying railroad track across
wild prairies?
Are large corporations omnipotent and invulnerable? Young Louis
Brandeis made his mark by assailing the corporate octopus that
dominated New England financially, politically, and socially: the
New Haven Railroad! Powerful firms cannot always bend customers
to their will. DuPont lost millions on Corfam; the Edsel is only the
most striking example of an automobile promotion that failed; and
Boeing is only one of many firms to find the Pentagon an incon-
stant customer. Nor are all large corporations immune from capital
markets. (None of them would be if they sacrificed profits to growth
in the manner Galbraith describes.) Of the 552 largest nonfinancial
corporations, 164 are public utilities, which borrow heavily and
constantly.
Galbraith's typical corporation is in manufacturing, a relatively de-
21. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
22. See W. BAUMOL, BusINEss BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH (1959).
23. See R. IARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF "IANAGERIAL" CAPITALISM (1964).
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clining sector of the economy. The truth, I suspect, is that most of
the time Galbraith is writing about General Motors, a deserving
enough target but hardly typical.
4. The Public Sector. The technostructure enjoys a symbiotic rela-
tionship with the federal executive and bureaucracy, especially the
Pentagon, and with strategic senior committee chairmen in Congress. 24
Public expenditure programs which support the planning system pros-
per. Those which help the market system and the general public
are shortchanged; their only political support comes from powerless
rank and file members of Congress.
Comment. Since the publication of The Affluent Society in 1958
-perhaps because of it, who knows?-public civilian use of goods and
services has increased from 10 percent of gross national product
to 19.5 percent. In addition, over the same period governmental
transfer payments to individuals have grown from 6 percent to 10.5
percent of personal income. These trends have not been deflected
by either Vietnam or the Nixon presidency. Civilian government
has grown fast, faster than the economy. Meanwhile defense has de-
clined from 9 percent of gross national product to 6 percent.
Galbraith's readers will not find these figures or any other recog-
nition that the civilian public sector is not as undernourished now
as when the earlier book voiced so eloquently his well merited com-
plaint. Well, aren't many public purposes still shortchanged, rela-
tive to the needs? Aren't streets still dirty, parks unsafe, schools in-
effective, inner cities blighted, mass transits abysmal, poor people
ill-fed, mental hospitals disgraceful, jails medieval, and the arts-
very important to Galbraith-neglected?
It's all too true, but the morals are not the ones Galbraith leads
the reader to draw. First, the problems are tougher than anyone
imagined or admitted. Schools, neighborhoods, cultures, transporta-
tion systems are not that easy to turn around. Money is necessary
but not sufficient. Second, legislators will support the public sector,
but what public sector? The sky's the limit for social security and
agricultural subsidies, not because these programs appeal to the
technostructure but because they, unlike jails and mental hospitals,
have irresistible constituencies.
Nothing in Galbraith's political theory prepares us for these dis-
tortions of priority, which are not the will of the corporate estab-
lishment but the outcome of pluralistic politics. That same politics
24. See generally pp. 134-45, 155-63.
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has not reduced defense spending enough to suit Galbraith or me,
but cuts in weapons orders have thrown major Pentagon contractors
into insolvency.
5. The Two Systems and Market Power. Jobs are secure and well
paid in the planning system. 25 The technostructure has long since
made its peace with the unions, knowing that labor costs can easily
be passed on to consumers. But those who cannot gain admission
to the planning system are relegated to the market system. Some are
self-employed, some are hired workers, but all are overworked, under-
paid, and untenured. The market systeni really operates like the
neoclassical model, with competition and flexible prices. The re-
sults are disastrous, in part because the planning system imposes
severe terms of trade on its powerless suppliers and customers.
Comment. The dual labor market observation rings true and
commands widespread agreement. However, by no means all pre-
ferred jobs with restricted access are within Galbraith's planning
system-consider construction workers, municipal employees, and other
well-organized crafts.
The claim that the planning system can with impunity dictate
prices to consumers and to the market system is less credible. Here
as elsewhere Galbraith artfully dodges the problem of aggregation.
The 1,000-firm planning system is not just a single corporation writ
large. Galbraith himself gives the various technostructures no credit
or blame for coordination; in fact he points out that their individual
plans frequently fail to mesh.
The sector as a whole may be able to pass on cost increases, simply
because the government, fearing unemployment, inflates demand as
needed. But this macroeconomic possibility does not mean that a
company is assured that its customers will still be there if it indi-
vidually raises prices. Likewise, large corporations are often compet-
ing with each other in buying supplies and services from the market
system.
6. Antitrust and Socialist Alternatives. Competition can never be
enforced in the planning sector. The antitrust myth, kept alive by
economists, serves the technostructure by diverting attention and
energy from real solutions.2"6 Anyway, the problem is not that the
planning system is too small, as conventional monopoly theory tells
us, but that it is much too large. Galbraith recommends (a) na-
25. See pp. 161-62.
26. See pp. 215-17.
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tionalization of big government contractors and of other "fully ma-
ture corporations" 27 (as well as of industries-medical care, transpor-
tation, residential construction-where private enterprise has clearly
failed)2 8 (b) limitation of executive rewards by aggressive unionism
(white collar as well as blue), by tax reform, and by government regu-
lation,29 (c) permanent wage and price controls.3 0
Comment. Certainly ,it is hard to be optimistic about antitrust
policy. Its history is full of decisions which actually impede com-
petition,3 ' while blatant concentrations without redeeming economic
virtue remain unscathed. Prosecutors and judges are often innocent
of economics. Federal administrations are timid. Solutions are gen-
uinely difficult. But fear of antitrust prosecution is a constraint on
corporate policy, and we had better not relax it.
The privileges of workers in large parts of the planning system
and elsewhere are protected by barriers to entry of other workers,
erected by unions with support from employers and governments.
This is a topic Galbraith completely avoids. There are no unkind
words about trade unions in this book though in the heat of politics
Galbraith has been known to speak unfavorably of George Meany.
If some industries in the planning system are too large, as Galbraith
alleges, it is because they indulge, not in too much price compe-
tition, quite the contrary, but in too much nonprice competition.
Galbraith dismisses as "illiberal" any ban on advertising.32 But, as
the present neoclassical liberal reviewer has long advocated, it would
be feasible, and not illiberal, to limit the tax deductibility of adver-
tising and sales expenses. As to Galbraith's complaint that top execu-
tive salaries and other perquisites are unconscionable and must be
brought under control, I can only say Amen. This, too, could be
handled in the tax law.
What is to be gained by nationalization of large "mature" cor-
porations if, as Galbraith observes, the technostructure would re-
main in command? Something would be lost-discipline of manage-





31. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967). Con-
tinental Baking Co. broke into Utah Pie's Salt Lake City market with cheaper frozen
apple pies than those offered by Utah Pie. The Court found price discrimination in
violation of § 2(a) of the Clayton Act.
32. Pp. 229-30.
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Anyway, Galbraith's socialist proposals are too casual- to be taken
seriously. Galbraith does not tell us how the investment needs of
a nationalized automobile company would be determined and fi-
nanced, how industries would operate half-nationalized and half-pri-
vate, how collective bargaining would be kept out of Washington
politics, or other details. Galbraith is certainly right that government
is bound to have a big role in transportation and medicine, but
again he does not face the really difficult problems, which will re-
main whether or not the industries are socialized.
7. Planning the Market System. The principal remedy for the
unequal development and inequality of the two systems is to equip
the market system with countervailing power. 33 Let small business-
men combine to "stabilize prices and output."34 Let government
regulate prices and output when, as in agriculture, producers cannot
combine on their own. Encourage unions; universalize and boost
the minimum wage. Encourage international commodity agreements;
do not on principle deny tariff protection to the market system. Pro-
vide government support for the educational, capital, and tech-
nological needs of the market system.
This program will reduce output and employment in the market
system. Indeed, that is its purpose-to eliminate production which
does not yield its producers a decent income. So there must be al-
ternative income guaranteed for those who are unable or unwilling
to find jobs. Galbraith evidently has in mind a negative income
tax; his illustration is a guarantee of $5000 for a family of five.35
Comment. This is the heart of the book. And this is where most
of Galbraith's fellow economists will disagree most strongly.
It really is a letdown to go through a supposedly revolutionary
book and to learn toward the end that salvation lies in those un-
lamented inventions of the early New Deal, the NRA and AAA.3,
In brief, Galbraith would have us each in toll booths where we could
share in tolls from passers-by, not because they choose to pay for
what we can produce but because they have no alternative. Yet there
will not be enough toll booths to go around, so the rest of us will
live on the dole. It is not just an inefficient prospect; it is unfair
and it is terribly dreary.
Today people in the "market system" are excluded from com-
33. See pp. 252-63.
34. P. 256.
35. P. 263.
36. See pp. 252-63.
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petition for the fruits of the "planning system." The solution is not
to remake the "market system" with the worst imaginable noncom-
petitive features. The answer is to break down barriers to equal op-
portunity throughout the economy.
8. Macroeconomic Policy. The planning system is inherently un-
stable. It is subject to failures of aggregate demand, to excess capacity
and unemployment, and to chronic inflation in every kind of eco-
nomic weather. For stabilizing demand, fiscal policy is the answer.
Raise government expenditure when demand is deficient; raise taxes
when it is excessive. The asymmetry is a virtue; the policy will
gradually raise the share of the public sector in the economy. When
the day for a symmetrical policy arrives, "it will be sufficiently
noticed and celebrated." 37
Monetary policy should almost never be used. Keep a permanent
level and structure of interest rates, "on the low side." 38 The reason
is that monetary policy is socially regressive, hitting the market sys-
tem, notably home building, but not the planning system.
The aim of demand policy is to avoid all but frictional unem-
ployment in the planning system and to stabilize prices in the
market system. But demand policy is not enough. To prevent in-
flation, beyond a slow drift to accommodate relative price adjust-
ments, permanent controls of wage bargains and of planning sys-
tem prices are required.
Comment. The chapter on macroeconomic policy is analytically
weak. For example, Galbraith confuses marginal and average pro-
pensities to save.39 And, after saying that rich people and corpora-
tions do not spend anyway, he tells us that the more we rely on
taxing them the more stabilizing the tax system will be.40 More
important, he throws away so many policy instruments that he leaves
policymakers with no practical way to stabilize aggregate demand.
Fiscal measures, especially expenditures, cannot be adjusted fast
enough.
Galbraith does not explain the basic causes of instability and
chronic inflation. The consistency of his two criteria for fiscal policy
-full employment in the planning system and price stability in the
market system-is surely not obvious. But Galbraith does not even
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sion. He does not defend his assertion that wage and price controls
need apply only to big boys. It needs defense-recent bouts of com-
modity inflation have made the union-corporation spiral look like
price stability. Anyway the author of this chapter evidently forgot
that a few pages earlier he was refashioning the market system in
the image of the planning system. Once he finishes that job, con-
trols will surely have to be universal. Finally, Galbraith assumes
without discussion that inflation is an intolerable evil, just as if he
were a Zurich banker.
9. Irrepressible Liberalism. How can reform prevail? Belief, politics,
government must be emancipated from the planning system and the
myths that serve it.41 Important among those myths is current edu-
cation in economics and other subjects. Emancipation will be ac-
complished by "Public Cognizance" of the inherent conflict between
the planning purpose and the public purpose.42
Comment. In the last pages of every Galbraith book hopeful
liberal faith triumphs over the unrelieved cynicism of the earlier
chapters. A neoclassical economist or a political philosopher might
blush to introduce "public interest" as a principle of obvious, un-
problematic content and application. Galbraith is as sure of the
public interest, and as dedicated to it, as the most starry-eyed ideal-
istic sophomore.
This confidence has been the foundation of Galbraith's great
contributions to the public weal. He awakened the literate public
to the undernourishment of the public sector. He challenged the
insatiable appetite of the Pentagon and its corporate allies. To any
readers of his present book who needed to be convinced that what
is best for General Motors or Exxon is not usually best for the
country, Galbraith has once again conveyed an important message.
41. See pp. 223-32, 241-51.
42. See p. 229.
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Beyond the Best Interests of the Child. By Joseph Goldstein, Anna
Freud 8c Albert J. Solnit. New York: The Free Press, 1973. Pp.
xiv, 170. $7.95.
Reviewed by Nanette Dembitzt
A judge usually can decide with self-confidence the legal and fac-
tual issues in litigation over who should have custody of a child.
Where he1 needs help, however, is in evaluating which of the avail-
able alternatives will best satisfy the child's psychological needs. The
mission of authors Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit in their new book
is to provide guidelines, based on psychoanalytic theory, to govern
the judge's decision in all types of child placement cases. The promise
is seductive but impossible; the authors fail to devise usable scales
because the amalgams of factors to be appraised in custody con-
tests are too complex.
It may be beyond the competence of any discipline to construct
a simple yardstick to measure, for example, whether ten-year-old
Ann will develop better with her mother or father, when (to men-
tion only a few factors): Her mother is outgoing, but overly per-
missive, and leaves the child with maids while traveling with her
paramour; her father is loving, but lives by rigid schedules, and,
according to Ann, has deserted her and her mother. Later in the
review, I shall detail regretfully the inefficacy of the authors' pro-
posed guidelines. The book does, however, make several persuasive
points concerning current child care controversies.
I
The authors believe that the law must "make the child's needs
paramount"2 over those of any adult. And the child's primary need
is for care by his "psychological parent," the adult who, regardless
of his biological relationship, satisfies the child's psychological as
well as material needs. 3 Thus, with exclusive focus on the child, the
t Judge, Family Court of New York State.
1. The masculine pronoun is used herein to refer to the feminine gender as well.
2. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
7 (1973) [hereinafter cited to page number only].
3. Pp. 98-99.
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authors are undaunted by the Supreme Court's constitutional con-
cern for the biological parent's status. 4
The authors emphasize society's interest in meeting the child's
needs through a psychological rendition of the Biblical warning
that the Lord will visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children:
Each time the cycle of grossly inadequate parent-child relation-
ships is broken, society stands to gain a person capable of be-
coming an adequate parent for children of the future.5
This cycle, according to the authors, cannot be broken if the child's
needs are disregarded whenever the biological parent asserts an al-
leged natural right to his child. Not only societal interest but simple
humanitarian concerns often dictate that the courts focus on the
needs of the helpless child rather than the claims of the biological
parents. Finally, the argument for looking only to the child's in-
terests gains strength from the civil libertarian thesis that no one
can claim ownership of an individual once he has left the womb. 6
Those arguing for the biological parent's claims to his child can
point to the parent's right, accepted by the authors, to automatic cus-
tody of the child at birth and can question whether this right can be
abrogated without good cause. The only answer to this argument
is something of an ipse dixit: The parent's right to initial custody
is a result of the state's policy of laissez faire as to natural processes;
when the parent's conduct precipitates state intervention in the par-
ent-child relationship, the state then may seek primarily to satisfy
the needs of its ward, the child.7
The issue of the parent's right versus the child's welfare has been
most dramatic in child adoption cases. In New York (whose prac-
tices are much discussed in the book) popular attention was aroused
by a 1971 case known as the Case of Baby Lenore. The highest
court of New York affirmed orders directing Lenore's return from
her established home with prospective adoptive parents to her bi-
ological mother, who had first permitted the baby's adoption and
then withdrawn her consent.8 The Court of Appeals reasserted the
4. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S 645, 651-52 (1972).
5. P. 7.
6. Anti-abortionists have argued that the American Civil Liberties Union and other
civil liberties groups are biased in refusing to attribute individual rights to a foetus.
7. The writer knows of no legal doctrine supporting the proposition, basic to the
book's theme, that the biological parent's right vanishes when it becomes the subject
of litigation. Nor is any suggested in this volume.
8. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 192, 269 N.E.2d 787,
791, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65, 70 (1971), ajf'g 36 App. Div. 2d 524, 317 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 805 (1971).
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New York doctrine that the biological parent has a "right to the
. . . child, superior to that of all others, unless he or she . . . is
proved unfit . . . ." At the same time the decision spoke in terms
of promoting the child's interest and welfare, and indeed emphasized
psychological, rather than material, well-being (although the book
implies that the judiciary frequently fails in this respect). The
junction between these two tracks was fashioned by the court's as-
sumption that a biological mother will provide "tender care and
love"'1  and that this affection "will endure.""
This assumption that maternal love is always born with the birth
of a baby surely is unjustified, particularly in the conflicted rela-
tionships which lead to court cases. Male judges, who generally are
fathers of biological children left in the care of their biological
mothers, may indulge this wishful assumption more than do female
judges. All courts, as the authors urge,12 should discard the doctrine
of the biological parent's superior right.' 3 Despite the perils of psy-
chological predictions, the courts in all cases must appraise, rather
than assume, who will be the best "psychological parent,"' 4-albeit,
in an individual case unusual psychological tensions about adoption
might weight the scales for the biological parent.'5
The doctrine of the biological parent's natural rights, which con-
tinues to appear in numerous New York decisions, reflects a deeply
held ethic. Even some child care social workers have suggested in
court that a mother who, for instance, is mentally ill should not
be denied her child; this is a punishment which should be in-
9. 28 N.Y.2d at 192, 269 N E.2d at 791. 321 N.Y.S 2d at 70.
10. 28 N.Y.2d at 194, 269 N.E.2d at 792, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
11. 28 N.Y.2d at 192, 269 N.E.2d at 791, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
12. See p. 98.
13. New York has enacted a provision similar to one in the authors' model code,
applicable to cases like the Case of Baby Lenore, providing that in such contests
"the best interest of the child" shall be the only determinant and "there shall be no
presumption" in favor of any of the contestants. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 383(5) (McKinney
Supp. 1973).
14. In Scarpetta, reliance on the assumption of the biological mother's love for the
child resulted in only a limited inquiry into her psychological fitness. For a broader
inquiry despite the presumption, see In re S., 74 Misc. 2d 154, 347 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Fam.
Ct. 1973); Stone v. Maglio, 62 Misc. 2d 292, 308 N.Y.S.2d 604 (Fam. Ct. 1970), stay
of adoption denied sub nom. People ex rel. Scaff v. Giglio, Motion No. 632 (App. Div.,
Feb. 26, 1970); Mittentaal v. Dumpson, 37 Misc. 2d 501, 511, 235 N.Y.S.2d 729, 738 (Fano.
Ct. 1962). For an unusual implementation of the doctrine of the natural parent's su-
perior right, see Apgar v. Beauter, 75 Misc. 2d 439, 441, 347 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875-76
(Faro. Ct. 1972) (sheriff must permit incarcerated mother to care for newborn baby in jail).
15. Judge Breitel (now Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals), looking
at this problem from the standpoint of the child's rights, suggested that a child has
a "claim ... to be reared by its natural parents , . . and to be freed of the emotional
problems associated with the status of being an adopted child .... ." People ex rel.
Anonymous v. Louise Wise Servs., 21 App. Div. 2d 327, 329, 250 N.Y.S.2d 507, 510 (1964).
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flicted on her only if she is unvirtuous or deliberately mistreating
the child. 6 Then, too, the parent's congenital claim may have re-
ligious underpinning: Some people may feel that a child ought to
be raised in the religion of its parents. Thus it is not only judges
to whom the authors must address their thesis of judicial focus
only on the child's needs.
II
The authors' orthodox theories of child development are an an-
tidote to current adventurism in child care. The child, they argue,
derives many benefits from "a relationship with two adults who
have an intimate relationship with each other"; 17 this conclusion
refutes the contention that a child need not be raised in a nuclear
family, that a single parent can care for a child adequately.', Par-
ents, they believe, who "reject their own male or female identity"'19
are unable to nurture a child's sense of identity and self-worth. Thus
homosexual couples would not be adequate psychological parents.20
The authors also hold that the child's "family relationships . . .
determine his social reactions." 2' Through identification with his
parents, the child will build "attitudes towards work and the com-
munity."22 Parents, however, "may provide the child with unsuitable
models for identification. 23
This emphasis on the impact of parental values on the child is
particularly relevant to parental neglect and abuse proceedings-a
large class of cases in family and juvenile courts. These neglect and
abuse cases typically involve low-income families, in which the mother
and children are on public assistance, and the father has disappeared.
Affluent mothers, of course, also are deserted by fathers; they as
well may be subject to alcoholism, mental illness, or periods of ir-
responsibility or hatred toward their children. They, however, can
employ caretakers or look to at-leisure relatives in order to protect
infants from being alone at night or other flagrant dangers. 24
16. But see In re B., 60 Misc. 2d 662, 664-66, 303 N.Y.S.2d 438, 441-43 (Fam. Ct.
1969), aff'd merne. sub nom. In re Behrman, 34 App. Div. 2d 527, 309 N.Y.S.2d 864 (1970).
17. P. 16.
18. CI. In re H., 69 Misc. 2d 304, 311-13, 330 N.Y.S.2d 235, 245-47 (Fain. Ct. 1972),
rev'd mem., 40 App. Div. 2d 513, 333 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1972).
19. Pp. 15, 17.
20. Cf. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.V.2d 588 (Ky. 1973), and cases therein cited which




24. See Dembitz, The Good of the Child Versus the Rights of the Parent, 86 POL.
Sci. Q. 389, 391-93 (1971).
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Poverty lawyers representing biological parents in neglect cases
often contend that the parent has a right to raise his child in his
"life-style" regardless of what the establishment regards as its malev-
olent effect on the child. A ghetto child, they argue, must learn
to cope with an environment filled with drugs, crime, prostitutes,
pimps, and other perils. An extreme of this argument, recently made
in a neglect case in New York City's Family Court, was that a
mother's deliberate punitive burning of her seven-year-old daughter's
arm with a curling iron was de minimis in comparison to the gen-
eral misery of life in Harlem and should therefore be ignored in
considering the child's need for foster care.
The authors may be responsive to poverty lawyers' philosophy,
for with respect to neglect and abuse cases, they seem inexplicably
reluctant to apply their assertions of the child's right to an un-
shadowed place in the sun. Together with the parent's recognized
constitutional right to rear his child as he wishes25 and the state's
recognized power to act as parens patriae for the child in neglect
cases, the child's own rights ought to be recognized as a third side
of a constitutional triangle. In this geometry a delicate balance must
be struck to determine if foster care indeed will benefit the child.
This reviewer suggests, however, that the principle of the para-
mountcy of the child's welfare, basic in this book, is as applicable
in neglect and abuse cases as in adoption or other child placement
disputes.
Finally, the authors' redirection of attention to familial influence
argues against the possibility that adverse parental influences can
be counteracted by changes in the schools and other social and po-
litical institutions. If the dose of adverse familial influence is con-
tinuing and virulent a child of course may grow obdurately hos-
tile and unresponsive; he may be unable to grasp an outsider's helping
hand. But the psychoanalytic approach to the problem should not
be taken to negate the need for social change. Institutions outside
the family may fail to offset parental influences on a child, but
25. The child's right may reach constitutional dimensions. See Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1922). In Wilder v. Sugarman, Civil No. 73-2644 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the
primary issue presented by the complaint is the constitutionality of state support of
sectarian child care institutions; the right of a parent to determine his child's re-
ligious upbringing and the right of the child to observe his religion are aspects of
the problem.
Concerning the rights of a minor to act contrary to parental wishes, see Melville v.
Sabbatino, 42 U.S.L.W. 2242 (Conn. Super. Ct., Oct. 5, 1973) (right of 17-year-old to
terminate hospitalization for mental illness); Doe v. Planned Parenthood Ass'n, 29 Utah
2d 356, 510 P.2d 75 (1973) (right of 16-year-old to receive contraceptive information
without parental consent).
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opportunities for employment, good wages, health care, birth con-
trol, and other material improvements for the parent may assuage
his despair and thus release positive feelings for the child, in a
social version of the capitalist theory of the "trickling down" of
benefits.
III
The authors' most important guideline for evaluation of the
child's needs and for changes in present court practices is the standard
of continuity-the child is said to need "continuity of relationships,
surroundings, and environmental influence."' 26 The indisputable value
of continuity is indeed hornbook law in custody and foster care
cases.27 But reliance on this one guideline ignores the mind-racking
necessity for weighing continuity against competing values.
The book recommends, for instance, that "because of the child's
need for continuity,"2 custody decrees pursuant to divorces should
be, as in adoption, "final, that is, not subject to modification."2
In either a broken or intact family, however, the child's relationship
to, and need for care by, the male or female parent may change
with passing years. Moreover, the custodial parent's ability to fill
the child's psychological needs may deteriorate, perhaps because of
the strain of divorce or sole custody. Parental rejection of the child,
alcoholism, an antagonistic paramour or second spouse are only three
more of other innumerable contingencies which may become of far
more importance to the child's welfare than the need for continuity.
The authors themselves recognize, but then ignore, that "[p]sycho-
analytic theory confirms the substantial limitations on our capacity
to make . . . a prediction [of which adult will best meet a child's
psychological needs]." 30 There is also the unfortunate but real pos-
sibility of a hasty or misguided initial custody decision, either by
the parties or the court. Thus the present presumption in favor
of continuity is as far as the continuity principle ought to be carried.31
Factors competing against continuity are equally difficult to ap-
26. P. 31.
27. Berlin v. Berlin, 21 N.Y.2d 371, 376-77, 235 N.E.2d 109, 112, 288 N.Y.S.2d 44,
48-49 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968); People ex rel. XX v. ZZ, 43 App. Div.
2d 196, 198 (1974); Dintruff v. McGreevy, 42 App. Div. 2d 809, 346 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1973).
See Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 619-21 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring) for the




31. See Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. at 613-14; Berlin v. Berlin, 21 N.Y.2d at 374, 235
N.E,2d at 110, 288 N.YS2d at 46; Rowe v. Rowe, 42 App. Div. 2d 830, 245 N.Y.S.2d
811 (1973); cf. Niles v. Niles, 42 App. Div. 2d 945 (1973).
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praise in proceedings for parental neglect. Suppose a mother asks a
judge to place her 11-year-old son in foster care because he "gets
on my nerves and I'm sick and nervous already," and her paramour
beats the boy for minor defiances. But the boy is so anxious to main-
tain his tenuous bond that he urges the judge: "Tell her she won't
get any more welfare if she sends me away." What should the judge
do? And suppose a child will receive continuous care in a foster
home but will feel rejected and unworthy if taken from his mother
(for a child in a neglect case-with the egocentricity stressed by the au-
thors-often blames himself for his own mistreatment). The mother,
on the other hand, has had continuous custody, yet has frequently
deserted the child or neglected to care even for his material needs.
How should the judge apply the continuity standard in such a case?
And, finally, suppose the judge foresees, for instance, that a child will
deteriorate as the condition of his mentally disturbed mother de-
clines; if the mother worsens, no foster parents may be found for
him.32 The continuity guideline is hardly useful in such a case.
The authors propose also that "the noncustodial parent should
have no legally enforceable right to visit the child, and the custodial
parent should have the right to decide whether it is desirable for
the child to have such visits."3 3 This rule is said to "protect the
security of an ongoing relationship-that between the child and the
custodial parent."34 The proposal is blind and untenable.
Visitation arrangements might well be in the child's interest, but
the custodial parent, wishing to punish a deserting spouse or erase
all connections or identifications with him, may refuse to allow
visits.35 It is true, as the authors suggest, that court-imposed visits
may disturb or embitter the custodial spouse. Mothers often say:
"Why should he see the baby, when I have to take care of it?"; "He
takes the child to see his mother who hates me."; "The father didn't
take the child out while we were together so why should he have
the right now?" Fathers say: "She deserted me and the children; she
has no right to see them now." A clear demarcation of rights and
obligations, however, sometimes quiets the custodial parent's anger.
32. In New York recent concern with the rights of foster parents and permanency
in parent-child relationships resulted not only in the legislation cited supra note 13, but
also in legislation requiring court review of any foster care placement lasting more
than two years, the objective being to terminate this divided arrangement between
foster and biological parents by either returning the child to the biological parent or
legally severing his hold and securing the child's adoption. See N.Y. Soc. SFRv. LAw
§ 392 (McKinney Supp. 1973). The thousands of foster care cases being reviewed under
this law are producing a wealth of social data.
33. P. 38.
34. Id.
35. Cf. Kresnicka v. Kresnicka, 42 App. Div. 2d 607, 345 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1973).
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But the disquiet that may attend court-ordered visitation must be
weighed against the child's needs for the psychological assets of the
parents and the child's feeling of confusion and rejection that may
follow the disappearance of the noncustodial parent. Finally, court
mediation, rather than argument between former spouses, may be
useful in settling disputes arising from major changes in erstwhile
agreeable visitation patterns. For instance, if the custodial mother
moves from New York to California, a new visitation program can
be arranged and increased expenses allocated equitably by a judicial
ruling.3 0
IV
The psychological calculus in child custody determinations com-
pels the question of whether judges are the ablest individuals to fac-
tor these equations. Certainly in most cases psychiatric and psycholog-
ical evaluations should be required before any order for a change
of custody is issued. It has been suggested further that judges should
make room on the bench for psychiatrists and other behaviorists in
deciding the psychosocial issue of criminal sentencing." Perhaps cus-
tody decisions as well should not be made by a legally trained judge
alone.
Fact finding by the adversary method is an essential first step in
custody cases. The psychiatrist studies emotions and attitudes rather
than actual happenings, and his techniques are not adapted to de-
termining facts. Moreover, his predictions of future behavior can be
grossly inaccurate. Diagnosis and prognosis of a child's welfare in
alternative custody situations therefore must depend largely upon
past facts. It is important, for example, to know whether the mother
left the home, as her husband contends, because she went to live
with a paramour, or whether, as she contends, she left because he
was drunk and violent. The actuality may be a better clue to which
parent will give stable care to the child than psychiatric diagnoses
of sado-masochism or hostility in the conjugal relationship.38 It is
36. See, e.g., Kovesdy v. Hines, 75 Misc. 2d 644, 647-48, 348 N.Y.S.2d 281, 285-86
(Fam. Ct. 1973).
37. See M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 69-124 (1973).
38. In discussing the need for hearings to insure accurate fact finding in juvenile
court proceedings (before such hearings were mandated by In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967)), a sociologist wrote:
However advanced our techniques for determining what an individual is, we have
not yet approached the point at which we may safely ignore what he has done.
What he has done may often be the most revealing evidence of what he is.
Allen, The Borderland of the Criminal Law: Problems of "Socializing" Criminal Justice,
32 Soc. SERv. REv. 107, 117 (1958). And psychiatric evaluations may be contradictory.
See In re Blaine, 54 Misc. 2d 248, 259, 282 N.Y.S.2d 359, 369 (Fain. Ct. 1967).
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important, for another example, to try to find out through the ad-
versary method whether the mother, accused by her child of abuse,
in fact did beat the child; if she did not, the psychiatrist tfien should
investigate not the child's reaction to the alleged beating but instead
his reasons for fantasizing or misrepresenting the parent's conduct.
After judicial fact finding, the ultimate determination of the best
"psychological" parent for the child, on the other hand, might be
made with more objectivity and skill by a panel of experts trained
in psychology and social sciences than by a judge alone. The deciding
goup should include the judge in order to insure due weight to
his finding of facts and to counteract the tendency of some behavior-
ists to discount facts which do not fit their analysis of a family's
psychodynamics.
The authors refrain from recommending participation by psychia-
trists and other experts in a custody decision, but they do advocate
independent legal representation for the child in all cases involving
child placement.3 9 To attack such a sacred and apparently innocuous
cow is doubtless heresy. Nevertheless, the New York Family Court's
extensive experience with counsel for the child indicates that the
authors have an exaggerated and unrealistic view of the utility of
such counsel in custody cases.4 0
As the authors themselves stress, the judge deals with finite possibil-
ities; he generally has to choose between two, or at the most three,
placement alternatives. The evidence for and against the alternative
custodians is developed by the adversary method: in divorce-custody
cases the mother against the father; in parental neglect cases the
Bureau of Child Welfare against the parents; in foster care or adop-
tion cases the biological parents against the foster parents. There is
little that counsel for the child can contribute to the fact finding
unless by some mere fortuity he is better prepared on the case
than the other attorneys or is a more competent interrogator. Thus
he often sits mute at the counsel table during the fact finding. In
evaluating the best-or as the authors phrase it, "the least detri-
mental" 41-of placement alternatives, Legal Aid Society lawyers, who
regularly act as "law guardians" for children in the Family Court's
59. Pp. 65-70.
40. N.Y. FAMmY CT. Acr § 249 (McKinney 1963) mandates appointment of an at-
torney for the child in all neglect and abuse proceedings; and counsel is discretionarily
appointed in many other proceedings involving custody. (Delinquency proceedings or
other proceedings against the child raise entirely different considerations; counsel for
the child is of course indispensable in such cases.)
41. P. 53.
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neglect and abuse proceedings, do contribute acumen, perspective,
and diligence in tapping resources. Save for this exception, however,
the experience and expertise of the child's counsel is generally far
less than the judge's in making the ultimate custody determination.
Finally, the authors' own desire for speedy determinations in child
placement cases may be frustrated by independent representation for
the child. The proliferation of attorneys generally presents practical
difficulties which prevent calendaring cases with dispatch. Securing
counsel for the child thus is a detriment to the child, if the counsel
is unlikely to contribute more than a superficial endorsement of
the position of one of the adult parties.42 Admittedly, this ostensibly
unbiased endorsement may serve as a crutch for a judge who wishes
support for his decision to award the child to that one party. None-
theless, routine appointment of counsel for the child in all custody
matters, as the authors recommend, would result in a ritualistic and
unconstructive use of the lawyer. It should be avoided.
The authors' major contribution in Beyond the Best Interests of
the Child is their emphasis on the child's right to the best "psy-
chological" parent, regardless of competing adult claims. The so-
cietal stake in effectuating this right is highlighted by the authors'
development of the thesis that the "child is father to the man" who
in turn may father still another child.43 Authors Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit observe, however, that "laws are made by adults for the pro-
tection of adult rights." 44 Thus, without continual insistence on the
rights of children, the adult community and adult-staffed legislatures
and courts may not be able to bring themselves to a recognition of the
rights of another class.
42. Then, too, the lawyer for the child may have a bias toward one of the adult
parties and act as a back up attorney for him. For example, during an unfortunate
period of eight months in 1970-1971, when "militant" leadership directed a section of
the Legal Aid Society, some Legal Aid lawyers representing children in parental neglect
cases routinely advocated, as part of their attack on the "establishment," the position
of the parent against the Bureau of Child Welfare.
43. See p. 7.
44. P. 106.
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